Abstract. General theoretical principles that enable the derivation of prior probabilities are of interest both in practical data analysis and, more broadly, in the foundations of probability theory. In this paper, it is shown that the general rule for the assignment of priors proposed by Jeffreys can be obtained from, and is logically equivalent to, an intuitively reasonable information-theoretical invariance principle Some of the implications for the priors proposed by Hartigan [1], Jaynes [2], and Skilling [3] , are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Any application of probability theory to a problem of data analysis requires the specification of a prior probability over the parameters being estimated on the basis of the given data. For example, suppose that we are given a coin, and suppose that we model the outcome of a toss of the coin as the outcome of a two-outcome probabilistic source with outcome probabilities P 1 , P 2 . After an experiment where the coin is tossed n times, we can estimate the value of P 1 on the basis of the data string D n = a 1 a 2 . . . a n , where a i is the outcome (1 or 2) of the ith toss, using Bayes rule, Pr(P 1 |D n , I) = Pr(D n |P 1 , I) Pr(P 1 |I) Pr(D n |I) .
The prior, Pr(P 1 |I), is undetermined by the theory of probability, and represents our state of knowledge prior to performing the experiment. Suppose that we have no knowledge about the origin or manufacture of the coin, so that, for example, the coin could be from general circulation or be a magician's coin. What prior over P 1 properly reflects this state of ignorance? Since the work of Bayes and Laplace, the question of how to assign Pr(P 1 |I) and, more generally, the prior Pr(P|I) where P is an N-dimensional probability vector, so as to reflect a state of ignorance, has received a succession of sometimes conflicting answers. For example, Bayes and Laplace assigned the uniform prior, Pr(P 1 |I) = 1, arguing on the ground of the general philosophical principle of uniformity that, lacking evidence to the contrary, one should assign equal weight to all possible values of P 1 . However, if one were to parameterise P 1 by the parameter θ , then such an argument could, reasonably, also be applied to θ ; but, if P 1 (θ ) were not a linear function of θ , it would then follow from Pr(P 1 |I)|dP 1 | = Pr(θ |I)|dθ | that Pr(P 1 |I) is not uniform. Although one could conceivably evade this objection by granting the parameter P 1 privileged status, it is difficult to find a compelling reason for doing so.
Similarly, if we are given the sample x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N from a unknown probability distribution, Pr(x| θ ), which could be continuous, where θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ K ) is a Kdimensional parameter vector, and we wish to determine Pr( θ |x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N , I), the prior Pr( θ |I) must be specified. For the case of sampling from a normal probability distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ , Jeffreys [4] argued that Pr(σ |I) ∝ 1/σ and, in [5] , suggested the prior Pr(ρ|I) ∝ 1/ρ (now known as Jeffreys' prior) be assigned to any continuous parameter, ρ, known to be positive, on the grounds that the prior over Pr(ρ m |I) is then also of this same form. However, no compelling reason was given for basing the prior upon the functions ρ m , and for excluding other functions of ρ.
Recognising the fragility of existing arguments for the assignment of priors such as Pr(P 1 |I), Jeffreys [6] considered the question of whether there exists a general principle for the assignment of priors that are immune to such objections. By investigating some mathematical expressions that could be plausibly viewed as quantifying the 'distance' between two discrete probability distributions, Jeffreys showed that some of these expressions lead, up to an overall multiplicative constant, to the same metric. Specifically, in the case of a probabilistic model of N possible outcomes, with N-dimensional probability vector P( θ ), where θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ K ) with 0 < K < N, the metric
Noting the invariance of (det g) 1/2 dθ 1 dθ 2 . . . dθ K under non-singular re-parameterisation of P, and appealing to the plausible desideratum that the prior probability Pr( θ |I) be invariant under such re-parameterisation, Jeffreys proposed the rule (referred to hereafter as Jeffreys' rule) that one assign the prior
From Jeffreys' rule, it follows, in contrast to the assumption of Bayes and Laplace, that
and, in the case of an N-outcome probabilistic source,
a prior which will be referred to as Jeffreys' multinomial prior. From Jeffreys' rule, it also follows for a normal distribution that Pr(σ |I) ∝ 1/σ , in agreement with Jeffreys' previous arguments. Compared with the rules for the assignment of priors that preceded it, Jeffreys' rule has the considerable advantage of being a general mechanical procedure, but it has the disadvantage of being reliant upon the metric in Eq. (2), which is not logically derived from a set of intuitively plausible postulates. Consequently, since its proposal, numerous other specific priors and assignment rules, such as in [1, 2, 3, 7, 8] , have been proposed where an attempt is made to base the derivations on intuitively plausible postulates. The main objective of this paper is to derive Jeffreys' rule from an intuitively plausible information-theoretic invariance principle. Some of the implications for some of the specific priors and rules for the assignment of priors that have been derived by other authors, such as in [1, 2, 3, 7, 8] , will also be briefly discussed.
DERIVATION OF JEFFREYS' MULTINOMIAL PRIOR
Suppose that an experimenter makes a trial of n interrogations of a probabilistic source with an unknown probability vector P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P N ) and obtains the data string, D n = a 1 a 2 . . . a N , of length n, where a i represents the value of the ith outcome. If the experimenter wishes to estimate P on the basis of D n , the only relevant data is the number of instances, m i of each outcome, i, which can be encoded in the data vector m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m N ) , or, equivalently, in the pair (n, f), where f = m/n is the frequency vector. Given the data vector, Bayes' theorem can be used to calculate the probability density function, Pr(P|f, n, I), where I represents the knowledge that the experimenter possesses prior to performing the interrogations.
Let us quantify the change in the experimenter's knowledge about P using the Shannon-Jaynes entropy functional. If the frequency vector f is obtained in n interrogations, the gain of information about P,
whose value depends upon the the prior probability, Pr(P|I). Consider the case where N = 2. Using Bayes' theorem, the posterior probability can be expressed as Pr(P|f, n, I) = Pr(f|P, n, I) Pr(P|I) Pr(f|P, n, I) Pr(P|I) dP 1 ,
where the likelihood,
In the limit of large n, the likelihood becomes very sharply peaked around m 1 = nP 1 so that the prior probability factors out of the integrand, and the posterior probability can be approximated by a Gaussian function of variance σ 2 = f 1 (1 − f 1 )/n. For the purpose of illustration, suppose the prior probability were chosen to be uniform. The information gain (Eq. 6) would then become
whose value is dependent upon f 1 . In the limit of large n, f 1 tends to P 1 . Hence, with respect to the information gained about the identity of P in the limit of large n, there would then be a difference between sources with different values of P. But, if we are ignorant as to the origin of the probabilistic source being interrogated, it is reasonable to require that the prior be such that the amount of information that the data D n provides about P should not depend upon what P happens to be. On the ground of this intuitively reasonable notion, we shall select Pr(P|I) such, in the limit of large n, the amount of information gained in n detections is independent of P. That is, we shall postulate:
Principle of Information Gain. In n interrogations of an N-outcome probabilistic source with unknown probability vector P, the amount of Shannon-Jaynes information provided by the data about P is independent of P for all P in the limit as n → ∞.
In order to implement this principle, we make use of the fact the Shannon-Jaynes entropy is invariant under a change of variables [9] . We shall parameterise the vector P by the (N − 1)-dimensional parameter vector λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ N−1 ), so that P = P( λ ), and then set the prior probability, Pr( λ |I), equal to a constant. This transforms the initial problem of determining the prior probability over P into one of determining the functions P i ( λ ).
The first step is to determine Pr( λ |f, n, I). From Bayes' theorem, the posterior probability,
In the second line, Pr( λ |n, I) has been set equal to Pr( λ |I). This follows from an application of Bayes' theorem, Pr( λ |n, I) Pr(n|I) = Pr(n| λ , I) Pr( λ |I), and the fact that n is chosen freely by the experimenter and therefore cannot depend upon λ . Hence, the posterior probability is proportional to the likelihood, Pr(f| λ , n, I). When n is large, using Stirling's approximation, n! = n n (2πn) 1/2 e −n + O(1/n),
Writing
where f = P( λ (0) ), and retaining only leading order terms in the λ l ,
where the proportionality constant is a function of the λ (0) l only, and where
We shall define the vector Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q N ) such that Q i = √ P i , so that Q lies on the positive orthant, S N−1 + , on the unit hypersphere, S N−1 , in an N-dimensional Euclidean space with axes Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q N . Equation (14) can then be rewritten as
In the case where N = 2,
where ds 2 = dQ 2 1 + dQ 2 2 , the Euclidean line element in Q 2 -space. The posterior probability, Pr(λ 1 |f, n, I), is therefore a Gaussian with standard deviation,
where λ (0)
, and, since Pr(λ 1 |I) is constant,
where s is the distance along the circumference of the positive quadrant of the unit circle, and where the relation Pr(λ 1 |I)|dλ 1 | = Pr(s|I)|ds| has been used in the second line. Independence of ∆H from f 1 can be ensured if and only if Pr(s|I) at λ If θ ∈ [0, π/2] is taken to be the polar angle in Q 2 -space, so that Q 1 = cos θ , then Q 1 = cos [s(λ 1 ) + γ], where γ is an arbitrary real constant. Hence, Q 1 = cos(αλ 1 + β ′ ) and P 1 = cos 2 (αλ 1 + β ′ ), where β ′ is an arbitrary real constant. Since Pr(λ 1 |I) is constant and since Pr(P 1 |I) |dP 1 | = Pr(λ 1 |I) |dλ 1 |, one obtains
The treatment for general N runs parallel to the above. Suppose that the λ l are chosen such that infinitesimal changes in the λ l generate orthogonal displacements in Q N -space. This can be done by using hyperspherical co-ordinates, (r, φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ N−1 ), with r = 1 and, for l = 1, . . . , N, with φ l being a function of λ l only. In that case, one finds that 
where ds 2 = dQ 2 1 + dQ 2 2 + · · · + dQ 2 N and where ds l = (∂ s/∂ λ l )| λ (0) dλ l . Since the λ l are independent variables, the prior Pr(s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N−1 |I) must be a constant independent of the λ l . Therefore, any area element, dA = ∏ 
which is Jeffreys' multinomial prior. To prove the converse, suppose that Jeffreys' multinomial prior is chosen, in which case Pr(Q|I) is constant on S
